The American has never yet had to face the trials of Job... Hitherto America has been the land of universal good will, confidence in life, inexperience of poisons. Until yesterday, it believed itself immune from the hereditary plagues of mankind. It could not credit the danger of being suffocated or infected by any sinister principle....

GEORGE SANTAYANA,
*Character and Opinion in the United States*

IN THE WINTER of 1961–62, the “radical right” emerged into quick prominence on the American political scene. The immediate reasons for its appearance are not hard to understand. The simple fact was that the Republican Party, now out of power, inevitably began to polarize (much as the Democrats, if they were out of power, might have split over the civil rights and integration issue), and the right wing came to the fore. The right-wing Republicans have an ideology—perhaps the only group in American life that possesses one today—but during the Eisenhower administration they had been trapped because “their” party was in power, and the American political system, with its commitment to deals and penalties, does not easily invite ideological—or even principled—political splits. An administration in office, possessing patronage and prestige, can “paper over” the inherent divisions within a party. But out of office, such conflicts are bound to arise, and so they did within the G.O.P.

Clearly there is more to all this than merely a contest for power within a party. Something new has been happening in American life. It is not the rancor of the radical right, for rancor has been a

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The Radical Right

recurrent aspect of the American political temper. Nor is it just the casting of suspicions or the conspiracy theory of politics, elements of which have streaked American life in the past. What is new, and this is why the problem assumes importance far beyond the question of the fight for control of a party, is the ideology of this movement—its readiness to jettison constitutional processes and to suspend liberties, to condone Communist methods in the fighting of Communism.

Few countries in the world have been able to maintain a social system that allows political power to pass peacefully from one social group to another without the threat of hostilities or even civil war. In the mid-twentieth century, we see such historical centers of civilization as France, let alone states just beginning to work out viable democratic frameworks, torn apart by ideological groups that will not accept a consensual system of politics. The politics of civility, to use Edward Shils’ phrase, has been the achievement of only a small group of countries—those largely within an Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian political tradition. Today, the ideology of the right wing in America threatens the politics of American civility. Its commitment and its methods threaten to disrupt the “fragile consensus” that underlies the American political system.

I believe that the radical right is only a small minority, but it gains force from the confusions within the world of conservatism regarding the changing character of American life. What the right as a whole fears is the erosion of its own social position, the collapse of its power, the increasing incomprehensibility of a world—now overwhelmingly technical and complex—that has changed so drastically within a lifetime.

The right, thus, fights a rear-guard action. But its very anxieties illustrate the deep fissures that have opened in American society as a whole, as a result of the complex structural changes that have been taking place in the past thirty years or so. And more, they show that the historic American response to social crisis, the characteristic American style, is no longer adequate to the tasks.

I

The Emergence of the Radical Right

Social groups that are dispossessed invariably seek targets on whom they can vent their resentments, targets whose power can serve to
The Dispossessed—1962

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explain their dispossession. In this respect, the radical right of the early 1960s is in no way different from the Populists of the 1890s, who for years traded successfully on such simple formulas as "Wall Street," "international bankers," and "the Trusts," in order to have not only targets but "explanations" for politics. What lends especial rancor to the radical right of the 1960s is its sense of betrayal not by its "enemies" but by its "friends."

After twenty years of Democratic power, the right-wing Republicans hoped that the election of Dwight Eisenhower would produce its own utopia: the dismantling of the welfare state, the taming of labor unions, and the "magical" rollback of Communism in Europe. None of this happened. Eisenhower's Labor Secretary courted the unions, social-security benefits increased, and, during the recession, unemployment benefits were extended, while the government, in good Keynesian style, ran a twelve-billion-dollar budgetary deficit. In foreign policy, Secretary of State Dulles first trumpeted a "liberation policy," and then retreated, talked brinkmanship but moved cautiously, announced a policy of "massive retaliation," and, toward the end of his tenure, abandoned even that, so that the subsequent Eisenhower moves toward summitry were no different from, or from a "hard" right line were "softer" than, the Truman-Acheson containment policy. Thus eight years of moderation proved more frustrating than twenty years of opposition.

Once the Democrats were back in office, the charge of softness in dealing with Communism could again become a political, as well as an ideological, issue. And the radical right was quick to act. The abject failure in Cuba—the name of the landing place for the abortive invasion, the Bay of Pigs, itself became a cruel historical joke—seemed to reinforce the picture of the United States that emerged out of the stalemate in Korea a decade ago—of a lurching, lumbering power, lacking will, unsure of its strength, indecisive in its course, defensive in its posture. The theme of the radical right was voiced by Rear Admiral Chester Ward (ret.), the Washington director of the American Security Council, who declared, "Americans are tired of defeats. They are tired of surrenders covered up as 'negotiated settlements.' They are, indeed, tired of so much talk and little action by our leaders. For the first time in sixteen years of the cold war, a demand for victory is beginning to roll into Washington."

Thus the stage was set.

The factors that precipitated the radical right into quick notoriety
in early 1961 were the rancor of their attacks and the flash spread of the movement in so many different places. McCarthyism in the mid-1950s was never an organized movement; it was primarily an atmosphere of fear, generated by a one-man swashbuckler cutting a wide swath through the headlines. In some localities—in Hollywood, on Broadway, in some universities—individual vigilante groups did begin a drumbeat drive against Communists or former fellow-travelers, but by and large the main agitation was conducted in government by Congressional or state legislators, using agencies of legislative investigation to assert their power. In contrast, the radical right of the 1960s has been characterized by a multitude of organizations that seemingly have been able to evoke an intense emotional response from a devoted following.

Three elements conjoined to attract public attention to the radical right. One was the disclosure of the existence of the John Birch Society, a secretive, conspiratorial group obedient to a single leader, Robert Welch, who argued that one could combat the methods of Communism only with Communist methods. Thus, membership lists were never disclosed, fronts were organized to conduct campaigns (such as the one to impeach Chief Justice Warren, which turned, with heavy-handed jocularity, into calls to "hang" him), and a symbol of patriotism was put forth in the name of an Army captain who had been shot in China by the Communists.

The second was the fashionable spread of week-long seminars of anti-Communist "schools," conducted by evangelist preachers who adapted old revivalist techniques to a modern idiom, which swept sections of the country, particularly the Southwest and California. These schools promised to initiate the student into the "mysteries" of Communism by unfolding its secret aims, or unmasking the philosophy of "dialectical materialism." And, third, there was the disclosure of the existence of extreme fanatic groups, such as the Minutemen, who organized "guerrilla-warfare seminars," complete with rifles and mortars, in preparation for the day when patriots would have to take to the hills to organize resistance against a Communist-run America. Such fringe movements, ludicrous as they were, illustrated the hysteria that had seized some sections of the radical right.

To a surprising extent, much of the radical-right agitation—and the spread of the seminar device—was unleashed by the Eisenhower
administration itself. In 1958, the National Security Council issued a directive, as yet still unpublished, which stated that it would be the policy of the United States government, as Senator Fulbright cited it, "to make use of military personnel and facilities to arouse the public to the menace of Communism." Following this directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National War College entered into consultation with the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Institute of American Strategy (a creation of the Richardson Foundation), to plan curriculum and seminars for reserve officers and local businessmen. A basic text was adopted, *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, edited by Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, of the University of Pennsylvania group. An equally influential text was the book *Protracted Conflict*, by Robert Strausz-Hupe and Colonel William Kintner, which argues that no negotiations with the Russians leading to a stable settlement are really possible. The Strausz-Hupe group is neither part of, nor should it be identified with, the lunatic fringes of the right. Its arguments are serious and subject to the debate and rival assessments of other scholars. But the actions initiated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff did lead to a large number of Projects Alert and indoctrination seminars, carried out by official Navy and Army spokesmen, that went far beyond the original scope of the National Security Council directive, and that brought into these sessions the pitchmen of the radical right.

In August, 1960 (as detailed in the Fulbright memorandum), the United States Naval Air Station, at Glenview, Illinois, sent out invitations to community leaders and businessmen, inviting them to a seminar on "Education for American Security." The announced purpose of the seminar was to stimulate an active force against "moral decay, political apathy and spiritual bankruptcy," and to teach the participants how to create similar schools in other Midwestern communities. The conference was addressed by a number of high-ranking naval officers. But it also included Dr. Fred C. Schwarz, the organizer of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade; E. Merrill Root, author of *Brainwashing in the High Schools* and *Collectivism on the Campus*, and an endorser of the John Birch Society; and Richard Arens, former research director of the House Un-American Activities Committee, and a member of Schwarz's Christian Crusade. The speeches during the sessions, according to the *Christian Century*, the liberal Protestant weekly published in Chicago, not only attacked
Communism but condemned as well "liberals, modernists, John Dewey, Harvard students, the New York Times, the American Friends Service Committee, pacifists, naïve ministers," and so on.

It was this same mixture of official military sponsorship and propagandists of the radical right that characterized dozens of similar seminars around the country. On April 21, 1961, the Chamber of Commerce of Greater Pittsburgh sponsored a Fourth-Dimensional Warfare Seminar, with the cooperation of the commanding general of the 2nd U. S. Army, Lieutenant General Ridgely Gaither, and his staff, at whose sessions the House Un-American Activities Committee film *Operation Abolition* was shown, and the principal speaker, Admiral Chester Ward (ret.), attacked Adlai Stevenson and George Kennan, as advisers to the President whose "philosophies regarding foreign affairs would chill the typical American." A Strategy for Survival conference held on April 14th and 15th in Fort Smith, Fayetteville, and Little Rock, Arkansas, sponsored by the local Chamber of Commerce and promoted by Major General Bullock, the area commander, heard speakers from Harding College, a small Baptist institution in Searcy, Arkansas, which has been the source of much extreme right-wing material. And on the program was the film *Communism on the Map*, prepared by Harding College, which equates Socialism with Communism. A Project Alert was organized at the Pensacola Naval Air Training station, in Florida, based on Harding College materials, and the program was repeated in similar "alerts" in Georgia, South Carolina, and Texas. Dr. Fred C. Schwarz held a seminar at the headquarters of the 8th Naval District, in New Orleans, which was endorsed by the Commandant, Rear Admiral W. G. Schindler. A Houston Freedom Forum was held by Schwarz's Christian Anti-Communism Crusade at which Admiral F. W. Warder gave the keynote address.

And so it went. In almost every area of the country, seminars, schools, and projects, organized by the military or by business groups in cooperation with the military, spread the propaganda of the radical right and gave a broad aura of authority and legitimacy to such propaganda and to such pitchmen of the radical right as the Reverend Dr. Schwarz and the Reverend Billy Hargis.
The Crisis in National Style

Every country has a "national style," a distinctive way of meeting the problems of order and adaptation, of conflict and consensus, of individual ends and communal welfare, that confront any society. The "national style," or the characteristic way of response, is a compound of the values and the national character of a country. As anyone who has read travelers' accounts knows, there has long been agreement on the characteristics of the American style.

The American has been marked by his sense of achievement, his activism, his being on the move, his eagerness for experience. America has always been "future-oriented." Europe represented the past, with its hierarchies, its fixed statuses, its ties to antiquity. The American "makes" himself, and in so doing transforms himself, society, and nature. In Jefferson's deism, God was not a transcendental being but a "Workman" whose intricate design was being unfolded on the American continent. The achievement pattern envisaged an "endless future," a life of constant improvement. Education meant preparation for a career rather than cultivation. When Samuel Gompers, the immigrant labor leader, was asked what labor's goal was, he gauged the American spirit shrewdly in answering, simply, "More."

Hand in hand with achievement went a sense of optimism, the feeling that life was tractable, the environment manipulable, that anything was possible. The American, the once-born man, was the "sky-blue, healthy-minded moralist" to whom sin and evil were, in Emerson's phrase, merely the "soul's mumps and measles and whooping cough." In this sense the American has been Graham Greene's "quiet American" or, to Santayana, "inexperienced of poisons." And for this reason Europeans have always found America lacking in a sense of the esthetic, the tragic, or the decadent.

American achievement and masculine optimism created a buoyant sense of progress, almost of omnipotence. America had never been defeated. America was getting bigger and better. America was always first. It had the tallest buildings, the biggest dams, the largest cities. "The most striking expression of [the American's] materialism," remarked Santayana, "is his singular preoccupation with quantity."
And all of this was reflected in distinctive aspects of character. The emphasis on achievement was an emphasis on the individual. The idea that society was a system of social arrangements that acts to limit the range of individual behavior was an abstraction essentially alien to American thought; reality was concrete and empirical, and the individual was the moral unit of action. That peculiar American inversion of Protestantism, the moralizing style, found its focus in the idea of reform, but it was the reform of the individual, not of social institutions. To reform meant to remedy the defects of character, and the American reform movement of the nineteenth century concentrated on sin, drink, gambling, prostitution, and other aspects of individual behavior. In politics, the moralistic residue led to black-and-white judgments: if anything was wrong, the individual was to blame. Since there were good men and bad men, the problem was to choose the good and eschew the bad. Any defect in policy flowed from a defect in the individual, and a change in policy could begin only by finding the culprit.

All of this—the pattern of achievement, of optimism and progress, and the emphasis on the individual as the unit of concern—found expression in what W. W. Rostow has called the “classic” American style. It was one of ad-hoc compromise derived from an implicit consensus. In the American political debates, there was rarely, except for the Civil War, an appeal to “first principles,” as, say, in France, where every political division was rooted in the alignments of the French Revolution, or in the relationship of the Catholic Church to the secular state. In the United States, there were three unspoken assumptions: that the values of the individual were to be maximized, that the rising material wealth would dissolve all strains resulting from inequality, and that the continuity of experience would provide solutions for all future problems.

In the last fifteen years, the national self-consciousness has received a profound shock. At the end of World War II, American productivity and American prodigality were going to inspire an archaic Europe and a backward colonial system. But the American century quickly vanished. The fall of China, the stalemate in Korea, the eruption of anti-colonialism (with the United States cast bewilderingly among the arch-villains), the higher growth rates in the western European economies at a time when growth in this country has slowed considerably, and the continued claims of Khrushchev
that Communism is the wave of the future have by now shattered the earlier simple-minded belief Americans had in their own omnipotence, and have left almost a free-floating anxiety about the future. In a crudely symbolic way, the Russian sputniks trumped this country on its own ground—the boastful claim of always being first. Getting to the moon first may be, as many scientists assert, of little scientific value, and the huge sums required for such a venture might be spent more wisely for medical work, housing, or scientific research, but having set the "rules of the game," the United States cannot now afford to withdraw just because, in its newly acquired sophistication, it has perhaps begun to realize that such competitions are rather childish.

But these immediate crises of nerve only reflect deeper challenges to the adequacy of America's classic national style. That style, with its ad-hoc compromise and day-to-day patching, rather than consistent policy formation, no longer gives us guides to action. The classic notion was that rights inhered in individuals. But the chief realization of the past thirty years is that not the individual but collectivities—corporations, labor unions, farm organizations, pressure groups—have become the units of social action, and that individual rights in many instances derive from group rights, and in others have become fused with them. Other than the thin veil of the "public consensus," we have few guide lines, let alone a principle of distributive justice, to regulate or check the arbitrary power of many of these collectivities.

A second sign that the classic style has broken down appears in the lack of any institutional means for creating and maintaining necessary public services. On the municipal level, the complicated political swapping among hundreds of dispersed polities within a unified economic region, each seeking its own bargains in water supply, sewage disposal, roads, parks, recreation areas, crime regulation, transit, and so on, makes a mockery of the ad-hoc process. Without some planning along viable regional lines, local community life is bound to falter under the burdens of mounting taxes and social disarray.

And, third, foreign policy has foundered because every administration has had difficulty in defining a national interest, morally rooted, whose policies can be realistically tailored to the capacities and the constraints imposed by the actualities of world power.
The easy temptation—and it is the theme of the radical right—is the tough-talking call for “action.” This emphasis on action—on getting things done, on results—is a dominant aspect of the traditional American character. The moralizing style, with its focus on sin and on the culpability of the individual, finds it hard to accept social forces as a convincing explanation of failure, and prefers “action” instead. Americans have rarely known how to sweat it out, to wait, to calculate in historical terms, to learn that “action” cannot easily reverse social drifts whose courses were charted long ago. The “liberation” policy of the first Eisenhower administration was but a hollow moralism, deriving from the lack of any consistent policy other than the need to seem “activist”—again part of the classic style—rather than from a realistic assessment of the possibility of undermining Soviet power in eastern Europe. Until recently, there has been little evidence that American foreign policy is guided by a sense of historical time and an accurate assessment of social forces.

Styles of action reflect the character of a society. The classic style was worked out during a period when America was an agrarian, relatively homogeneous society, isolated from the world at large, so that ad-hoc measures were a realistic way of dealing with new strains. As an adaptive mechanism, it served to bring new groups into the society. But styles of action, like rhetoric, have a habit of outliving institutions. And the classic style in no way reflects the deep structural changes that have been taking place in American life in the past quarter of a century.

IV

The Sources of Strain

Although the crisis in national style can be detected most forcefully in the realm of foreign policy, there have been, in the past thirty years, deep changes taking place in the social structure that are reworking the social map of the country, upsetting the established life-chances and outlooks of old, privileged groups, and creating uncertainties about the future which are deeply unsettling to those whose values were shaped by the “individualist” morality of nineteenth-century America.

The most pervasive changes are those involving the structural relations between class position and power. Clearly, today, political
position rather than wealth, and technical skill rather than property, have become the bases from which power is wielded. In the modes of access to privilege, inheritance is no longer all-determining, nor does "individual initiative" in building one's own business exist as a realistic route; in general, education has become the major way to acquire the technical skills necessary for the administrative and power-wielding jobs in society.

In the older mythos, one's achievement was an individual fact—as a doctor, lawyer, professor, businessman; in the reality of today, one's achievement, status, and prestige are rooted in particular collectivities (the corporation, being attached to a "name" hospital, teaching at a prestigious university, membership in a good law firm), and the individual's role is necessarily submerged in the achievement of the collectivity. Within each collectivity and profession, the proliferation of tasks calls for narrower and narrower specializations, and this proliferation requires larger collectivities, and the consequent growth of hierarchies and bureaucracies.

The new nature of decision-making—the larger role of technical decision—also forces a displacement of the older elites. Within a business enterprise, the newer techniques of operations research and linear programming almost amount to the "automation" of middle management, and its displacement by mathematicians and engineers, working either within the firm or as consultants. In the economy, the businessman finds himself subject to price, wage, and investment criteria laid down by the economists in government. In the polity, the old military elites find themselves challenged in the determination of strategy by scientists, who have the technical knowledge on nuclear capability, missile development, and the like, or by the "military intellectuals" whose conceptions of weapon systems and political warfare seek to guide military allocations.

In the broadest sense, the spread of education, of research, of administration, and of government creates a new constituency, the technical and professional intelligentsia, and while these are not bound by some common ethos to constitute a new class, or even a cohesive social group, they are the products of a new system of recruitment for power (just as property and inheritance represented the old system), and those who are the products of the old system understandably feel a vague and apprehensive disquiet—the disquiet of the dispossessed.
Many of the political changes that have transformed American society originated in measures taken thirty and more years ago. In many instances, the changes have been irrevocably built into the structure of American society. Why then have the consequences of these changes—and the reactions to them—become so manifest, and produced such rancor, at this time?

It was Walter Bagehot who said that the Reform Bill of 1832 was "won" in 1865—that political reforms are secured largely through generational change. New legislation may stipulate a set of reforms, but the administration of the law, its judicial interpretation, and its enforcement are in the hands of an older political generation which may hinder the changes. Only when the new generation comes of age are the judiciary and the bureaucracy taken over, and men educated in the "new spirit of the time" come into the established framework of power.

In this sense, the social enactments of the New Deal came to fruition thirty years later. While the Roosevelt administration created a host of new regulatory agencies, the judiciary, in its values and social outlook, largely reflected the ancien régime, and even though there was no entrenched bureaucracy, like those of Germany, France, or Britain, that would impede or distort these reforms, the lack of a broad intelligentsia made it difficult to staff the regulatory agencies without drawing in the business community, the trade associations, and the like. Thus, while the enactments of the Roosevelt administration seemed to many conservatives to be startlingly revolutionary, the business community—the main group whose power was abated—could, through the courts, Congress, and often the administrative agencies, modify substantially the restrictions of the regulations.

The paradoxical fact is that while the New Deal has lost much of its meaning on the ideological or rhetorical level, the fabric of government, particularly the judiciary, has been rewoven with liberal thread so that on many significant issues—civil rights, minority-group protection, the extension of social welfare—the courts have been more liberal than the administrations. Only Congress, reflect-
ing the disproportionate power of the rural areas and the established seniority system, has remained predominantly under conservative control.

In identifying "the dispossessed," it is somewhat misleading to seek their economic location, since it is not economic interest alone that accounts for their anxieties. A small businessman may have made considerable amounts of money in the last decade (in part because he has greater freedom than a large corporation in masking costs for tax purposes), and yet strongly resent regulations in Washington, the high income tax, or, more to the point, his own lack of status. To the extent that any such economic location is possible, one can say that the social group most threatened by the structural changes in society is the "old" middle class—the independent physician, farm owner, small-town lawyer, real-estate promoter, home builder, automobile dealer, gasoline-station owner, small businessman, and the like—and that, regionally, its greatest political concentration is in the South and the Southwest, and in California. But a much more telltale indicator of the group that feels most anxious—since life-styles and values provide the emotional fuel of beliefs and actions—is the strain of Protestant fundamentalism, of nativist nationalism, of good-and-evil moralism which is the organizing basis for the "world view" of such people. For this is the group whose values predominated in the nineteenth century, and which for the past forty years has been fighting a rear-guard action.

The present upsurge of American nativism—one aspect of the radical right—is most directly paralleled in the 1920s, in the virulent assaults on teachers' loyalty by the fundamentalist churchmen in the name of God, and by patriotic organizations like the American Legion in the name of country. These conflicts—expressed most directly in the Scopes trial on the teaching of evolution in Tennessee, and the bellicose efforts of Mayor Big Bill Thompson in Chicago to expunge favorable references to Great Britain from the school textbooks—were between "fundamentalists" and "modernists," between "patriots" and "internationalists."

These skirmishes of the 1920s were the first defensive attacks of the nativist and the old middle-class elements. They arose in reaction to the entry into society of formerly "disenfranchised" elements, particularly the children of immigrants and members of minority
ethnic groups—an entry made through the urban political machines, the only major route open to them. In short, it was a reaction to the rise of a mass society.

Until the mid-1920s, America in its top and middle layers had been, politically and culturally, a fairly homogeneous society. As Walter Lippmann pointed out in 1928, in a neglected but prescient account of the times, American Inquisitors, "those who differed in religion or nationality from the great mass of the people played no important part in American politics. They did the menial work, they had no influence in society, they were not self-conscious and they produced no leaders of their own. There were some sectarian differences and some sectional differences within the American nation. But by and large, within the states themselves, the dominant group was like-minded and its dominion was unchallenged."10

But in time its dominion was challenged, and principally from the cities. The year 1920 was the first in American history when a majority of persons lived in "urban territory."11 The children and the grandchildren of the immigrants began to come of political age. The movement to the cities and the gradual cultural ascendancy of metropolitan life over rural areas, accentuated by the rise of the automobile, motion pictures, and radio—creating, for the first time, a national popular culture—began to threaten established customs and beliefs. Thus, there was no longer, as Lippmann pointed out at the time, "a well-entrenched community, settled in its customs, homogeneous in its manners, clear in its ultimate beliefs. There is great diversity, and therefore there are the seeds of conflict."

Faced with the rise of "heretical" beliefs, the religious fundamentalists in Tennessee put forth the argument, self-evident to them, that teaching in the schools ought to conform to the views of the majority. If the people of Tennessee did not believe in evolution, they had a right to demand that it be stopped. And as Lippmann wryly commented, there was warranty for such a populist demand in Jefferson's bill for the establishment of religious freedom in Virginia, in 1786, which declared that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."

Intellectually, the fundamentalists were defeated and the modernists won; their views came to predominate in the country. But the fundamentalist temper of the 1920s still holds strong sway in rural-
dominated states. As David Danzig has pointed out, "the States that repudiated Darwinianism and Al Smith are today prominent among those nineteen that have passed 'Right to Work' laws since 1950." And, paradoxically, although they have become intellectually and socially dispossessed, the fundamentalist "regions" have risen to new wealth in the last fifteen years or so. The industrialization of the South and Southwest, the boom in real estate, the gushing wealth of oil in Texas and Oklahoma have transformed the fundamentalist churches and the Southern Baptist movement into a middle-class and upper-middle-class group. Small wonder that, possessing this new wealth, the fundamentalist groups have discovered the iniquity of the income tax.

The social ideas of fundamentalism are quite traditional—a return to the "simple" virtues of individual initiative and self-reliance. In political terms, this means dismantling much of the social-security program, eliminating the income tax, reducing the role of the federal government in economic life, and giving back to the states and local government the major responsibilities for welfare, labor, and similar legislation. Until now, much of the political strength of the right has stemmed from its ability to block the reapportionment of seats in the state legislatures (and to gerrymander seats for Congress), resulting in a heavily disproportionate representation of the small-town and rural areas in both assemblies. In Tennessee—whose flagrant failure to act precipitated the Supreme Court decision in April, 1962, ordering the reallocation of seats—although the state constitution specified that a reapportionment be made every ten years, the state legislature, since 1901, had rejected all bills attempting to carry out that mandate. As a result, in the voting for the Tennessee State Senate, one-third of the electorate nominated two-thirds of the legislators. In almost every state of the Union one could point to similarly glaring disproportions—though none so astounding as in California, where the single state senator from Los Angeles represents 6,038,771 persons, while a colleague from a rural area represents 14,294 persons, a ratio of 422.5 to 1. In forty-four states, less than forty per cent of the population can elect a majority of the state legislators; in thirteen states, fewer than a third of the voters can elect a majority. How quickly this will change, now that the federal courts are empowered to act, remains to be seen.
To list the managerial executive class as among the dispossessed may seem strange, especially in the light of the argument that a revolution which is undermining property as the basis of power is enfranchising a new class of technical personnel among whom are the business executives. And yet the managerial class has been under immense strain all through this period, a strain arising in part from the status discrepancy between their power within a particular enterprise and their power and prestige in the nation as a whole.

The old family firm was securely rooted in the legal and moral tradition of private property. The enterprise "belonged" to the owner, and was sanctioned, depending on one's theological tastes, by God or by Natural Law. The modern manager lacks the inherited family justifications, for increasingly he is recruited from the amorphous middle class. He receives a salary, bonus, options, expense accounts, and "perks" (use of company planes, memberships in country clubs), but his power is transitory, and he cannot pass on his position to his son.15

In order to justify his position, the manager needs an ideology. In no other capitalist order but the American—not in England, or Germany, or France—has this drive for ideology been so compulsive. This ideology is no longer derived from private property but from enterprise, the argument being that only the American corporate system can provide for economic performance. But if performance is the test, then the American manager more and more finds himself in a sorry position. The growth rate of the American economy in the past decade has been surprisingly small. And the "legitimacy" of the manager—the question of who gives him the right to wield such enormous economic power—has been challenged in a series of powerful arguments by Berle, Galbraith, and others.

Within the enterprise, the new corporation head often finds himself with the vexing problem of trying to "downgrade" the importance of the trade-union leader—in order to raise his own status. In an age when management is deemed to be a great and novel skill, involving the administration of production, research, finance, merchandising, public relations, and personnel, the company president feels that there is little reason now to treat union leaders as equals—
especially when labor is, after all, only one of a large number of the "co-ordinates of administration." Labor relations, he feels, should be reduced to their proper dimension, as a concern of the personnel manager.

Yet the corporation head is often unable to obtain even this satisfaction—as has been evident in the steel industry. For years the industry smarted at the union's power, particularly at U. S. Steel, where in 1957 a new management team, headed by Roger Blough, a lawyer with no experience in production, took over. Blough's predecessor, Ben Fairless, an old production hand who had come up through the mill, had cleverly sought to assuage the vanity of Dave McDonald, the steel-union president, by joint "walking tours" through the plant. There was talk of "mutual trusteeship" by the managers of capital and the managers of labor. But Blough would have none of this charade, and when it was evident that because of slack demand the industry could take a strike, it did so.

The strike lasted three months and ended only with the intervention of Vice-President Nixon and Labor Secretary Mitchell (after Blough and McDonald met secretly at the Vice-President's home), who feared the political consequences in the 1960 campaign of such a long-drawn-out struggle. The strike proved in this, as in a dozen other areas, that the industry could not escape the checkrein of government—not even in a Republican administration. This was demonstrated even more dramatically by Roger Blough's comeuppance in 1962. In the spring of 1962 the Kennedy administration, in an effort to maintain the wage-price line, brought pressure on the steel union to sign an early contract that provided some small fringe benefits but, for the first time in the union's history, no direct wage increase. Shortly afterward, however, U. S. Steel, followed by most of the industry, announced an immediate price rise. In a burst of fury, the colossal weight of the federal government was mobilized against the big steel firms—through threats of prosecution, cancellation of government purchase orders, and the cajoling of the business community—and in short order the industry gave in.

It is unlikely that the business community will take this crashing demonstration of governmental power without making some countervailing efforts of its own on the political level. Already in 1960 the efforts of a number of corporations, led by General Electric, to go "directly" into politics, in imitation of the unions—by taking a
The Radical Right

public stand on political issues, by sending out vast amounts of propaganda to their employees and to the public, by encouraging right-to-work referendums in the states—indicated the mood of political dispossession in many corporations. Since then, a significant number of corporations have been contributing financially to the seminars of the radical-right evangelists. Despite the black eye General Electric—the most vocal defender of free enterprise—received when the government disclosed that G.E. as well as a dozen other electrical manufacturing companies had been guilty of illegal price-rigging and cartelization, it is likely that the Kennedy-Blough imbroglio of 1962 will provide an even greater impetus for corporations to finance right-wing political activity in the coming years.

VII

The Military Dispossessed

The irony for the American military establishment is that at a time when, in the new states, the military has emerged as the ruling force of the country (often because it is the one organized group in an amorphous society), and at a time in American history when the amount of money allocated to military purposes—roughly fifty per cent of the federal budget—is the highest in peacetime history, the military is subject to challenges in its own bailiwick. The problems of national security, like those of the national economy, have become so staggeringly complex that they can no longer be settled simply by common sense or past experience. As a writer in the Times Literary Supplement recently put it, "The manner in which weapons systems are likely to develop; the counters which may be found to them; the burdens which they are likely to impose on the national economy; the way in which their possession will affect international relations or their use the nature of war; the technical problems of their control or abolition; all these problems are far beyond the scope of the Joint Planning Staff study or the Civil Service brief."

The fact is that the military establishment, because of its outmoded curriculum, its recruitment and promotion patterns, the vested interests of the different services, and the concentration at the top levels of officers trained in older notions of strategy, is ill equipped to grasp modern conceptions of politics, or to use the tools
There is little in the curriculum to prepare the officer for the realities of participating in the management of politico-military affairs. While the case-study and war-games approaches give the officer a direct understanding and "feel" for the logistics and organizational apparatus that must be "moved" for military operations, there is no equivalent training for the political dimensions of international relations. . . .

All evidence indicates that both absolutists and pragmatists—in varying degree—overemphasize the potentials of force. The realistic study of international relations involves an appreciation of the limits of violence. Military education does not continually focus on these issues, as it relates both to nuclear and limited conventional warfare. Paradoxically, military education does not emphasize the potentialities of unconventional warfare and political warfare, since these are at the periphery of professionalization.19

In the last decade, most of the thinking on strategic problems, political and economic, has been done in the universities or in government-financed but autonomous bodies like the Rand Corporation. A new profession, that of the "military intellectual," has emerged, and men like Kahn, Wohlstetter, Brodie, Hitch, Kissinger, Bowie, and Schelling "move freely through the corridors of the Pentagon and the State Department," as the T.L.S. writer observed, "rather as the Jesuits through the courts of Madrid and Vienna three centuries ago."

In structural terms, the military establishment may be one of the tripods of a "power elite," but in sociological fact the military officers feel dispossessed because they often lack the necessary technical skills or knowledge to answer the new problems confronting them. Since the end of World War II, the military has been involved in a number of battles to defend its elite position, beginning in 1945 with the young physicists and nuclear scientists, down to the present action against the "technipols" (the technicians and political theorists, as the military derisively calls them), whom Secretary McNamara has brought into the Department of Defense.

The first challenge came from the scientists over the issue of continuing military control of atomic energy. In a burst of almost H. G. Wellsian messianism, the scientists moved into the political arena.
And, as a result of skillful lobbying by enthusiastic young scientists from Los Alamos, Chicago, and Brookhaven, Congress passed the McMahon Bill, which set up the Atomic Energy Commission under civilian control. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific head of the Manhattan District project, which constructed the atom bomb, became a leading adviser to the State Department and was one of the principal authors of the Baruch plan.

The advent of the Cold War, in 1947-48, raised a number of issues that divided the scientists and the military even further, and for the next four years a "hidden struggle" between the two elites went on in the labyrinthine corridors of Washington. The chief issue was whether or not to build an H-bomb. The scientists in the General Advisory Committee to the A.E.C., in overwhelming majority—including Oppenheimer, Conant, Rabi, duBridge—opposed the construction of the H-bomb, but lost out. A different issue was raised about the need for defense. The Strategic Air Command, the big-bomber striking arm of American power, argued that no defense against atomic attack was possible and claimed that the only effective deterrent against the Russians would be the threat of massive retaliation. In strategy, this would mean reliance solely on heavy atomic bombs. Against the S.A.C., the scientists claimed that continental defense was possible—if the United States could be made invulnerable to attack, negotiations with the Russians could be opened from strength—and, furthermore, that western Europe could be defended with limited, tactical atomic weapons, so that the United States was not wholly dependent upon "big-bomb" deterrents.

To test their arguments, the scientists got support—in some cases surreptitiously—from backers in the National Security Council for a series of "games." Project Lincoln was set up at M.I.T. to study the problems of defense, which resulted later in the radar net of the D.E.W., or early-warning system, in the Arctic. Project Vista, which enlisted some five score scientists from different universities, was set up at the California Institute of Technology to study the use of tactical atomic weapons.

The S.A.C. pooh-poohed both projects, deriding continental defense as a Maginot Line of the air. And it sought to block the distribution of both projects' findings. Eventually, the results from the two laboratories were adopted. An early-warning system was created, and the N.A.T.O. strategy was revised, which meant, in effect, that the S.A.C. monopoly of atomic policy was broken.
Although Robert Oppenheimer had not been the prime instigator of these moves—except in the case of Project Vista—he became the symbol of the scientific opposition to the big-bomber command. In November, 1953, when Lewis Strauss was appointed by President Eisenhower to the chairmanship of the Atomic Energy Commission, Oppenheimer was charged with being a security risk. The basis of the charge—that Oppenheimer had in the later 1930s been sympathetic to a number of Communist fronts—had long been known to the security agencies. But the real inspiration for the A.E.C. action, as is evident from testimony before its special panel, came from men who believed fervently in the theory of strategic air power, who resented Oppenheimer's influence, and could draw only sinister conclusions from his stands on policy.  

The Oppenheimer case is now almost a decade behind us, and a shameful instance of national folly; the specific strategic issues regarding the role of manned bombers as the major weight of military power have by now been outmoded by the work on missiles. The originally small scientific community, whose members, drawn from a few university centers, knew each other intimately, has greatly expanded, and with the rise of space exploration, missile technology, and the like, it is no longer dominated by the small group of nuclear physicists who charted the new atomic age. Nor does it any longer, needless to say, have the rough unanimity of outlook that characterized it in the immediate postwar decade. And yet, though the military won the first round of their fight with the nuclear scientists, in the present decade its position as the shaper, as well as the executor, of strategic policy has been consistently eroded. For in present-day decision-making, the nature of strategy involves a kind of analysis for which experience is insufficient. If one takes the complex problem of the choice of "weapons systems," the long lead time that is necessary in the planning and testing, let alone the production, of weapons forces an analyst to construct mathematical models as almost the only means toward rational choices. The recent controversy over the desirability of the RS-70 bomber is a case in point. The systems analysts in the office of the Secretary of Defense, led by Charles Hitch, an economist from Rand who has become the comptroller in the Pentagon, decided on the basis of computer analysis that the manned RS-70 bomber would long be outmoded by the time it could come into full production, and that it would be wiser to concentrate on missiles.  

Dismayed by this decision, the Strategic
Air Command and its allies in the aircraft industry invoked Congressional support, and the House Military Affairs Committee voted money for the bomber.

But the "technipols," with McNamara at their head, have gone far beyond the use of linear programming or other planning devices for making more rational choices in the allocation of military resources. The entire Pentagon has been almost completely reorganized so as to reduce the importance of the traditional service arms—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—and to introduce "functional" groupings, whereby missions from each of the services are grouped together for budget and strategic purposes in order to test their effectiveness.

The point of all this is that such reorganization means more than the introduction of modern management practice into a top-heavy bureaucratic structure. For the reorganization on program and mission lines stemmed from a new conception of the strategic distribution of the armed forces—a political conception of the role of limited wars and nuclear capabilities, most of which came from the "technipols," rather than from the military establishment.

The traditional services, and their chiefs, have reacted to all this with dismay. As an article in Fortune put it, "It was at this point that the military professionals began to exhibit real alarm. McNamara did not ignore them; they had their say, as usual, in defense of their service budgets. But his drive, his intense preoccupation with figures and facts, left the Chiefs and their staffs with the feeling that the computers were taking over." And the Fortune article, reflecting the dismay of the service Chiefs, was also a veiled attack on McNamara's penchant for "quantification"; for his failure to respect "the uncomputable that had made Curtis Le May [the head of the big-bomber command] the world's finest operational airman"; for his "inexperience" in military strategy and for his reliance on the technipols, "the inner group of lay experts who were dispersed through State, the White House and Defense." The import of the article was clear: the traditional military professionals were being dispossessed.22

On any single set of political or strategic issues, it is an exaggeration, of course, to speak of "the military," or "the scientists," or "the military intellectuals," as if these were monolithic entities. On any particular set of issues, or even on fundamental values, members of the scientific community are often sharply at odds (for example,
Edward Teller and Hans Bethe), as are the political strategists, from the "protracted-conflict" line of the University of Pennsylvania group (Strausz-Hupe and Kintner) to the various arms-control and bargaining or negotiation schemes advanced by Thomas Schelling and Hans Morgenthau.

But the main point is that the military community is no longer the only, or even the dominant, source from which the strategists are drawn, and the older military leaders particularly, with vested interests in military doctrines and weapons systems derived from their own by now parochial experiences, find themselves in danger of being ignored or shelved. A few—Major General Walker is an example—may feel that all intellectuals are involved in a plot against the nation. No doubt most of the military men will be forced, as is already happening, into the more complex and bureaucratic game of recruiting particular groups of scientists for their own purposes (in part through the power of the purse), or attempting to make alliances. In the long run, the military profession may itself become transformed through new modes of training, and a new social type may arise.

But one can already see, in the behavior of retired military officers, the rancor of an old guard that now finds its knowledge outdated and its authority disputed or ignored, and that is beginning to argue, bitterly, that if only "their" advice had been followed, America would not be on the defensive. A surprising number of high-ranking officers on active duty as well as high-ranking retired officers have become active in extreme-right organizations. The Institute of American Strategy, which is financed by the Richardson Foundation—a foundation set up by the late Sid Richardson, who, along with H. L. Hunt, was among the richest of the new Texas oil billionaires—has on its board, and among its members, Rear Admiral Rawson Bennett, Chief of Naval Research; Lieutenant General E. C. Itschner, Chief of Engineers; Rear Admiral H. Arnold Karo; Lieutenant General George W. Mundy, Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; and General E. W. Rawlings (U.S.A.F., ret.), the executive vice-president of General Mills, Inc. The American Security Council, for example, lists on its national strategy committee such retired officers as Admiral Arthur W. Radford, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had been one of the leading exponents of "massive retaliation"; General Albert C.
Wedemeyer, who served in China; Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond; Admiral Felix B. Stump; Admiral Ben Moreell (now head of the Republic Steel Corporation); and Rear Admiral Chester Ward.

More active as anti-Communist entrepreneurs are some lesser lights who have held Army posts, often in Intelligence work, and who seek political status accordingly. Thus Brigadier General Bonner Fellows (ret.), a wartime aide to General MacArthur, is the national director of a group called For America, and chairman of the Citizens Foreign Aid Committee, which, despite its name, seeks to reduce foreign aid. Lieutenant Colonel Gunther Hartel (ret.), a former Intelligence officer in Europe and the Far East, heads an organization called American Strategy, Inc. These and other retired officers are active in the various "seminars" and public meetings organized by the radical-right groups.

The stock in trade of almost all these individuals is the argument, reinforced by references to their experiences, that negotiation or co-existence with Communists is impossible, that anyone who discusses the possibility of such negotiation is a tool of the Communists, and that a "tough policy"—by which, *sotto voce*, is meant a preventive war or a first strike—is the only means of forestalling an eventual Communist victory.

VIII

*The Polarities of American Politics*

*and the Prospects of the Radical Right*

A meaningful polarity within the American consensus has always been part of the American search for self-definition and self-identity: Jefferson versus Hamilton, Republicanism versus Federalism, Agrarianism versus Capitalism, the frontier West versus the industrial East. However significant such polarities may have been in the past, there seems to be little meaningful polarity today. There is no coherent conservative force—and someone like Walter Lippmann, whose *The Public Philosophy* represents a genuine conservative voice, rejects the right, as it rejects him—and the radical right is outside the political pale, insofar as it refuses to accept the American consensus. Nor does a viable left exist in the United States today. The pacifist and Socialist elements have been unable to make the peace issue salient. The radicals have been unable to develop a comprehensive
critique of the social disparities in American life—the urban mess, the patchwork educational system, the lack of amenities in our culture. Among the liberals, only the exhaustion of the “received ideas,” such as they were, of the New Deal remains. It is a token of the emptiness of contemporary intellectual debate that from the viewpoint of the radical right, the Americans for Democratic Action constitutes the “extreme left” of the American political spectrum, and that Life, in order to set up a fictitious balance, counterposes the tiny Councils of Correspondence, a loosely organized peace group led by Erich Fromm and David Riesman, as the “extreme left,” to the “extreme right” of the John Birch Society.

The politics of conflict in any country inevitably has some emotional dimension, but in the United States, lacking a historically defined doctrinal basis—as against the ideological divisions of Europe—it takes on, when economic-interest-group issues are lacking, a psychological or status dimension. In this psychological polarity, the right has often been splenetic, while the mood of the left has traditionally been one of ressentiment. Today the politics of the radical right is the politics of frustration—the sour impotence of those who find themselves unable to understand, let alone command, the complex mass society that is the polity today. In our time, only the Negro community is fired by the politics of resentment—and this resentment, based on a justified demand for equity, represents no psychological polarity to the radical right. Insofar as there is no real left to counterpoise to the right, the liberal has become the psychological target of that frustration.

One of the reasons why psychological politics can flare up so much more easily here than, say, in Great Britain is the essentially “populist” character of American institutions and the volatile role of public opinion. In the ill-defined, loosely articulated structure of American life, public opinion rather than law has been the more operative sanction against nonconformists and dissenters. Though Americans often respond to a problem with the phrase “there ought to be a law,” their respect for law has been minimal, and during periods of extreme excitement, whether it be the vigilante action of a mob or the removal of a book from a school library, the punitive sanctions of opinion quickly supersede law. The very openness or egalitarianism of the American political system is predicated on the right of the people to know, and the Congressional committees, whether searching into the pricing policies of corporations or the political
beliefs of individuals, have historically based their investigative claims on this populist premise.

It has always been easier to "mobilize" public opinion on legislation here than it is in England, and in the United States the masses of people have a more direct access to politics. The Presidential-election system, (as against a ministerial system), with the candidates appealing to every voter and, if possible, shaking every hand, involves a direct relation to the electorate. And in the Congressional system, individual constituents, through letters, telephone calls, or personal visits, can get through immediately to their representatives to affect his vote. The Congressional system itself, with its elaborate scaffolding of Senatorial prerogative, often allows a maverick like Borah, Norris, or Robert La Follette to dominate the floor, or a rogue elephant like Huey Long or Joseph McCarthy to rampage against the operations of the government.

But while the populist character of the political institutions and the sweeping influence of public opinion allow social movements to flare with brush-fire suddenness across the political timberland, the unwieldy party system, as well as the checks and balances of the Presidential and judicial structures, also act to constrain such movements. In a few instances, notably the temperance crusade, a social movement operating outside the party system was able to enforce a unitary conception of social behavior on the country; and even then prohibition was repealed in two decades. Until recently, the party and Presidential system have exerted a "discipline of compromise" that has put the maverick and the rogue elephant outside the main arena of the political game.

Within this perspective, therefore, what are the prospects of the radical right? To what extent does it constitute a threat to democratic politics in the United States? Some highly competent political observers write off the radical right as a meaningful political movement. As Richard Rovere has written, "The press treats the extreme Right as though it were a major tendency in American politics, and certain politicians are as much obsessed with it as certain others are with the extreme Left. If a day arrives when the extreme Right does become a major movement, the press and the obsessed politicians may have a lot to answer for. For the time being, there seems no reason to suppose that its future holds anything more than its present. There is no evidence at all that the recent proliferation of radical, and in some cases downright subversive, organizations of a
Rightist tendency reflects or has been accompanied by a spread of ultraconservative views. On the contrary, what evidence there is suggests that the organizations are frantic efforts to prevent ultra-conservatism from dying out."

In his immediate assessment, Rovere is undoubtedly right. In the spring of 1962, both former Vice-President Nixon and Senator Goldwater had moved to dissociate themselves from the extremist right. Nixon quite sharply repudiated the Birchites, on the premise that they are already a political liability, and Goldwater did so more cautiously in expressing his concern that, if not the Birchites, then its leader, Robert Welch, may have gone too far. Yet the future is more open than Rovere suggests. It is in the very nature of an extremist movement, given its tensed posture and its need to maintain a fever pitch, to mobilize, to be on the move, to act. It constantly has to agitate. Lacking any sustained dramatic issue, it can quickly wear itself out, as McCarthyism did. But to this extent the prospects of the radical right depend considerably on the international situation. If the international situation becomes stable, it is likely that the radical right may run quickly out of steam. If it were to take a turn for the worse—if Laos and all of Vietnam were to fall to the Communists; if, within the Western Hemisphere, the moderate regimes of Bolivia and Venezuela were to topple and the Communists take over—then the radical right could begin to rally support around a drive for "immediate action," for a declaration of war in these areas, for a pre-emptive strike, or similar axioms of a "hard line." And since such conservatives as Nixon and Goldwater are committed, at least rhetorically, to a tough anti-Communist position, they would either be forced to go along with such an extreme policy or go under.

Yet, given the severe strains in American life, the radical right does present a threat to American liberties, in a very different and less immediate sense. Democracy, as the sorry history of Europe has shown, is a fragile system, and if there is a lesson to be learned from the downfall of democratic government in Italy, Spain, Austria, and Germany, and from the deep divisions in France, it is that the crucial turning point comes, as Juan Linz has pointed out, when political parties or social movements can successfully establish "private armies" whose resort to violence—street fightings, bombings, the break-up of their opponents' meetings, or simply intimidation—cannot be controlled by the elected authorities, and whose use of
violence is justified or made legitimate by the respectable elements in society.

In America, the extreme-right groups of the late 1930s—the Coughlinites, the German-American Bund, the native fascist groups—all sought to promote violence, but they never obtained legitimate or respectable support. The McCarthyite movement of the early 1950s, despite the rampaging antics of its eponymous leader, never dared go, at least rhetorically, outside the traditional framework in trying to establish loyalty and security tests. The Birchers, and the small but insidious group of Minutemen, as the epitome of the radical right, are willing to tear apart the fabric of American society in order to instate their goals, and they did receive a temporary aura of legitimacy from the conservative right.

Barbarous acts are rarely committed out of the blue. (As Freud says, first one commits oneself in words, and then in deeds.) Step by step, a society becomes accustomed to accept, with less and less moral outrage and with greater and greater indifference to legitimacy, the successive blows. What is uniquely disturbing about the emergence of the radical right of the 1960s is the support it has been able to find among traditional community leaders who have themselves become conditioned, through an indiscriminate anti-Communism that equates any form of liberalism with Communism, to judge as respectable a movement which, if successful, can only end the liberties they profess to cherish.

1 “Memorandum Submitted to the Department of Defense on Propaganda Activities of Military Personnel,” by Senator Fulbright, Congressional Record, August 2, 1961, pp. 13436–13442. As the New York Times summarized this N.S.C. directive on June 17, 1961, “President Eisenhower and his top policy leaders decreed that the cold war could not be fought as a series of separate and often unrelated actions, as with foreign aid and propaganda. Rather, it must be fought with a concentration of all the resources of the Government and with the full understanding and support of the civilian population. It was decided, in particular, that the military should be used to reinforce the cold-war effort.”

2 I am following here the account of Murray Kempton in the New York Post, October 26, 1961.

3 Typical of this line is the question constantly reiterated by the Reverend Billy Hargis: “How can you explain the mistakes of our leaders for the last 30 years if there aren’t Communists giving them advice?” Hargis is one of the more flamboyant evangelists of the radical right. He publishes The Weekly Crusader, which contains a Foreign Intelligence Digest Section, written by Major General Charles A. Willoughby (ret.). Willoughby was General Douglas MacArthur’s Intelligence chief in the Pacific.

4 For a technical elaboration of this psychological mechanism, see Leon
Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Row, Peterson; Chicago, 1957), especially Chapter 10, which reports the study of the rumor. Festinger's theory seeks to explain how individuals try to reconcile—or, technically, "to reduce the dissonance" of—the holding of two inconsistent beliefs at the same time; e.g., the belief that smoking reduces tension and the fear that smoking may produce cancer. When beliefs are specific, denial may be one simple means, conversion to an opposite view follows under certain specifiable conditions, or, if the apprehensions are vague, the creation of "fear-justifying" threats becomes another mechanism.

In the light of Festinger's theory, it would be interesting to confront a sample of the radical right with the problem of explaining the belief in the rising internal threat of Communist infiltration into *government* with the continued presence of J. Edgar Hoover—the one figure who seems to be sacrosanct to the right—as director of the F.B.I. Since Hoover has been in office all through the years when Communism was allegedly growing as an internal threat, how explain the inability of the F.B.I. to cope with it? One could say that the Communists were cleverer than Hoover, but that would tarnish his image. Or one could say that Hoover had been shackled by the successive administrations—even a Republican one. But if that were the case, why would such a stalwart anti-Communist accept such shackles? One could retort that Hoover felt his role in office to be more important than a grand gesture of renunciation (such as General Walker's). But if the Communist infiltration has been so enormous as to extend almost to, if not into, the White House, why would he not step out and unmask the plot? But then, since the Communist threat may grow even greater, he would still be needed in office—or, horrors to admit the thought, it may well be that, reversing G. K. Chesterton's *The Man Who Was Thursday*, J. Edgar Hoover is himself the chief agent of the Communist conspiracy in America, and that could explain the protection the conspiracy has received so far. The possibilities of such a thought are clearly quite provoking, and it may well be that Robert Welch, in the privacy of his office, has entertained them. But if that were so, who, then, is immune from the plague?

5 The "style" of a country, or of an organization, is in this sense a literary counterpart of the idea of an "operational code"—the do's and don'ts that implicitly prescribe and proscribe permissible modes of action for an organization or a group. For an explicit, technical application of this concept, see Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1951).

6 One viewpoint argues that national character is rooted in the language system of each society. Thus, as an old joke has it, the Englishman *earns* his living; the Frenchman *gagne* (gains); the German *verdient* (earns—with the connotation of serving); the American *makes* his livelihood; and the Hungarian *keretznenni* (looks for and finds) his living.

7 The forms of murder and the styles of pornography mirror a society, for they disclose ways in which, actually and vicariously, the society satisfies forbidden desires. Death in the American mode is impersonal, sudden, and violent, rather than a lingering disease, as, say, in *The Magic Mountain*. Pornography in Mickey Spillane (in contrast with the French *L'Histoire d'O*, with its complex account of slavish female submission to sinister erotic wants) is a slashing, compulsive emphasis on brute masculinity—which betrays its own fear of castration or impotence.

9 For an earlier discussion of the historical sources of this moralism, see Chapter 2.
11 The sociological definition of "urban"—using government statistical data—is a difficult task. Thus, in 1920 about 54,157,000 persons lived in "urban territories" and 51,550,000 in "rural territories." But rural is defined, at the time, as places under 2500 population. Clearly many persons living in small towns partake of "rural" attitudes. Thus, in 1920 sixteen million of those in "urban territories" lived in towns under 25,000 population. If one takes the 25,000 population as the dividing line between "urban" and "small town," then it was only in 1960 that a majority of Americans lived in urban areas. Since 1950, of course, the movement of city dwellers to the suburbs has complicated the definitional problem. If one takes the census definition of a metropolitan area as a guide (i.e., populations living within a county, or group of contiguous counties, possessing at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants), by 1950 slightly more than half of the United States population lived within metropolitan areas. (For the confirmable data, see *The Historical Statistics of the United States*, Series A, 195–209, and the *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.*, 1960, pp. 14–15.)
13 As for the actual meaning of these ideas, as Richard Hofstadter pointed out in a memorandum for the Fund for the Republic in 1955, "A casual survey of the contents of some of the right-wing periodicals will show that the fear of modernity which inspired the fundamentalist crusades of the 1920s and the dislike of the polyglot life of the city, and of Jewish and Catholic immigrants, which inspired the Ku Klux Klan, is still alive among the extreme right."
14 The rationalizations for the farm programs of the various administrations—which support farm prices and give the farmer money not to produce—offer a fascinating example of the ideological moralizing of the right. For those reared on fundamentalist virtues, the idea of being paid not to produce creates considerable moral quiescence. Yet, given the overproduction in agriculture, the operation of a free market would serve only to wipe out thousands of farmers immediately. The function of the acreage restrictions is to adjust supply to demand, and farm-price supports provide an "income cushion" in order to ease the lot of the farmer. These programs, costing billions of dollars a year, are defended ideologically on the ground of protecting private property. But the effort—which has the same protective function—to help workers through unemployment compensation is attacked as weakening moral fiber, and the suggestion that technological changes which disrupt the established lives of thousands be retarded is attacked as impeding progress.
16 The National Education Program, at Harding College in Arkansas, which prepares films on communism and materials on free enterprise, has been used extensively by General Electric, U. S. Steel, Olin Mathieson Chemical, Monsanto Chemical, Swift & Co., and others. Boeing Aviation and the Richfield Oil Company have sponsored many of the anti-Communism seminars on the West Coast. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Company has a widespread propaganda program for its employees. One of the most active firms is the
Allen Bradley Company, of Milwaukee, which makes machine tools and electrical equipment. The Allen Bradley Company advertises in the John Birch Society magazine and reprinted Dr. Fred Schwarz's testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee, a reprint which Schwarz claims had "wider distribution than any other government document in the history of the United States, with the possible exception of the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution." The Allen Bradley Company, which constantly extols the virtue of free enterprise, was one of the companies convicted of collusive bidding and illegal price-rigging.

One of the factors that has acted to safeguard democracy in England and the United States is that both countries have never had any permanently large standing armies. The insularity of England made it place its protection in the Navy, whose forces were always far from shore, and the continental isolation of the United States made it unnecessary to build up any permanent military force. Where large armies have existed, the military, because it has represented an organized bloc whose control over the means of violence could be decisive, has almost invariably been pulled into politics. Thus the German Army in one crucial situation, in 1920, defended the Weimar Republic (against the Putschists of the right), but in a second crucial instance, in 1932 (the machinations of von Schleicher), contributed to its downfall. In Spain in 1936, in France in 1960, and more recently in Argentina, Turkey, Korea, Pakistan, Burma, and so on, the armed forces have been the decisive political element in the society.

The decision of the special A.E.C. panel was a curious one. Its chairman, Gordon Gray, president of the University of North Carolina, noted that if the board could use common sense rather than apply the stringent rules of the security regulations, its decision might have been different. But in the light of those regulations, while Oppenheimer's "loyalty" was affirmed, he had to be declared a security risk. The full A.E.C. board, by a four-to-one vote, rendered an even harsher judgment in forbidding Oppenheimer access to all classified material. See also, Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Policy (Princeton University Press, 1962), Chap. IV, for a discussion of Project Vista and Project Lincoln.

Much of the newer economic thinking is reflected in the study by Charles Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Harvard University Press, 1961), completed at Rand before Hitch was appointed comptroller in the Pentagon.

See "The Education of a Defense Secretary," by Charles J. V. Murphy, Fortune, May, 1962. Murphy, the military correspondent of Fortune, has consistently reflected the views of the military establishment in its battles
with the scientists and other critics of the military. Murphy's comprehensive story of the reorganization of the Pentagon is the first account of the "hidden" conflicts between the traditional services and McNamara that has resulted from the introduction of long-range programming in the Defense Department. As Murphy writes, "So swiftly did he move that the high brass again and again found itself confronted by a McNamara decision while it was still mulling over his initial direction for action.

"In two months McNamara produced blueprints for the Kennedy line of action for both the strategic and the conventional forces. The new requirements in the first area was drawn up by a task force under a former Rand economist, Charles J. Hitch, the Defense Department comptroller. Those for the limited-war forces were developed by another task force under Paul H. Nitze, a former investment banker and State Department planner who was and remains the Assistant Defense Secretary for International Security Affairs.

"The job was pretty much over and done before the military had more than grasped that something unusual was going on. By tradition, the military services had generated their own requirements. It was they who proposed, the civilians who disposed. Under McNamara, however, the system was suddenly turned upside down. Now it was McNamara and his lay strategists who were saying what weapons and what forces in what numbers were needed; the service Chiefs found themselves in the strange position of reviewing weapon systems and force structures they had never formally considered."